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ACORN v. EDWARDS: DID THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SQUIRREL
AWAY STATES' TENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT
THE COST OF NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL WELFARE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Lead poisoning among children, arguably the United States'
most vulnerable population,' has reached nearly epidemic propor-
tions over the past several decades. 2 Concerns about lead poison-
ing stem from the detrimental and irreversible effects exposure has
on children's neurological and physical development. 3 Consider-
ing the many sources of lead, including paint chips, gasoline, food,
water and dust, it is no wonder that lead's ill effects have become so
widespread. 4 In enacting the Lead Contamination Control Act of
1. See Diane Cabo Freniere, Comment, Private Causes of Action Against Manu-
facturers of Lead-Based Paint: A Response to the Lead Paint Manufacturers' Attempt to
Limit Their Liability by Seeking Abrogation of Parental Immunity, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 381, 384-85 (1991) (noting children are especially susceptible to effects of
lead because their neurological and nervous systems are not yet fully developed);
see also Steven Waldman, Lead and Your Kids, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 42 (dis-
cussing environmental threat lead poses to children). Although adults are not im-
mune to lead's effects, they are able to tolerate greater levels of exposure than are
children.
2. SeeJames 0. Mason, From the Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Public Health
Service, 265 JAMA 2049, 2049 (1991). One commentator states, "lead poisoning is
the [number one] environmental disease that faces young children .... Id. Em-
phasizing the magnitude of the lead contamination problem, he adds:
[A]n attack on lead is vitally important to the health of our children.
However silently it damages our children's minds and limits their abili-
ties, lead poisoning's impact is real. It has already affected millions of
children, and only through bold and persistent action can we prevent it
from affecting millions more.
Id.
3. See generally Jody W. Zylke, Preventive Medicine's Latest Goal: Getting Lead Out
to Protect Children, 266 JAMA 315 (1991) (summarizing effects of childhood expo-
sure to lead). For a discussion of the effects of lead on the development of chil-
dren as determined in controlled studies, see Herbert L. Needleman, M.D. et al.,
Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance of Children with Elevated Dentine Lead
Levels, 300 NEW ENG.J. MED. 689 (1979); Herbert L. Needleman, M.D. & Constan-
tine A. Gatsonis, Ph.D., Low-Level Lead Exposure and the IQ of Children, 263JAMA 673
(1990); Herbert L. Needleman, M.D. et al., The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low
Doses of Lead in Childhood: An 11-Year Follow-Up, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83 (1990).
4. See Mark A. Meyer, Lead Poisoning: Will Missouri's New Legislation Get the Lead
Out?, 2 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 16, 17 (1994) (discussing lead's harmful effects
and need for intervention into lead contamination problem).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated that
30-50% of children's exposure to lead is from dust and soil, 25% is from food, 20%
is from drinking water and 5% comes directly from inhalation of air contaminated
(479)
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1988 (LCCA), 5 Congress demonstrated both its recognition of
lead's destructive effects on children as well as a need for legislative
intervention to address the lead poisoning problem. 6
In ACORN v. Edwards,7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit scrutinized this effort by critically assessing the
constitutionality of certain requirements Congress imposed on Lou-
isiana through LCCA. 8 The Fifth Circuit addressed whether Con-
gress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause 9 and
impermissibly intruded upon Louisiana's state sovereignty in man-
dating the establishment of remedial programs to assist local educa-
tional agencies, schools and day care centers in controlling lead
contamination in their drinking water systems. 10 In holding that
LCCA violated Louisiana's sovereign authority, the Fifth Circuit
reasserted the judiciary's recognition of states' Tenth Amendment
rights."
with lead particles. See Kenneth M. Reiss, Note, Federal Regulation of Lead in Drink-
ing Water, 11 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 285, 287 (1991-92).
5. Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-572, 102 Stat.
2884 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-21-26 (1994)) (amending
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974)) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300fj (1994)) [hereinafter LCCA].
6. See generally H.R. REP. No. 100-1041 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3793. By enacting LCCA, Congress intended to safeguard the health of American
youth through the elimination of lead poisoning caused by lead contaminated
electric drinking water coolers. See id. at 5. For further discussion of LCCA, see
infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
7. 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2532 (1997).
8. See id. One group of authors summarizes the requirements of LCCA as
follows:
The Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988 required EPA to provide
guidance to states and localities on testing for and remedying high levels
of lead in a school's drinking water. Testing and correction is voluntary,
with the exception that the law requires testing, recall, repair and/or re-
placement of water coolers with lead-lined storage tanks or with parts
containing lead.
Ann Fisher et al., Schools Respond to Risk Management Programs for Asbestos, Lead in
Drinking Water and Radon, 4 RISK - ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFErY 309, 313 (1993).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Commerce Clause states: "The Congress
shall have Power... [t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.. . ." Id.
10. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1393. The Fifth Circuit, finding support in the
Supreme Court's reasoning in New York v. United States, recognized that neither
ACORN nor Louisiana understood the relationship between the Tenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause as established by the New York Court. See id. at
1392. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1392-94. For a discussion of cases involving judicial
challenges of congressional power, and the judiciary's recently increased recogni-
tion of states' Tenth Amendment rights, see infra notes 57-94 and accompanying
text.
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ACORN
This Note addresses the issues considered by the Fifth Circuit
in ACORN Part II sets forth the facts, procedural history and hold-
ing of ACORN 1 2 Next, Part III includes a discussion of LCCA, the
Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment and outlines prior judi-
cial treatment of the conflicts between federal and state legislative
powers. 13 Then, Part IV reviews the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
ACORN..14 Subsequently, Part V critiques the Fifth Circuit's conclu-
sion that Louisiana's sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment pre-
vented Congress from regulating electric drinking water coolers
through invocation of its Commerce Clause power.15 Finally, Part
VI suggests that in light of the judiciary's inconsistent history re-
garding the division of federal and state legislative powers, the Fifth
Circuit decided ACORN on grounds which, although legally sound,
may foster disparate results among the states in the area of environ-
mental policy.16
II. FACTS OF ACORNL v. EDWAROS
The controversy surrounding ACORNbegan when the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and
two concerned parents sent several Louisiana executive officials a
"Notice of Intent to File Suit" alleging Louisiana's violation of sec-
tions 1464(c) and 1464(d) of LCCA.17 Section 1464(c) requires
that each state disseminate a guidance document, a testing protocol
12. For a full discussion of the facts, procedural history and holding of
ACORN, see infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
13. For a comprehensive discussion of the statutory and constitutional under-
pinnings of the Fifth Circuit's ACORN decision, as well as the relevant cases which
preceded ACORN, see infra notes 31-94 and accompanying text.
14. For a detailed account of the Fifth Circuit's analysis in ACORN, see infra
notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 112-37
and accompanying text.
16. For a proposal of the potential impact of ACORN on future conflicts in-
volving the legislative authority of the federal and state governments, see infra
notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
17. See ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1388-89 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997). The Fifth Circuit, collectively referring to the plaintiffs as
"ACORN" for the purposes of simplicity, commented:
Suit was actually filed on behalf of ACORN, Illene Sippio, individually
and as the natural tutrix of her minor daughter, and Frank Crosby, indi-
vidually and as the natural tutor of his minor son. Sippio and Crosby are
parents of children attending schools that did not receive the EPA list
timely and that employ drinking water coolers contained on the list....
Id. at 1389 n.5. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund sent the "Notice of Intent to
File Suit" on behalf of ACORN, the children of Frank and Sheryl Crosby, the chil-
dren of Illene D. Sippio, and all other similarly situated children in Louisiana. See
id. at 1389 n.3. The "Notice of Intent to File Suit" was sent to the Louisiana Gover-
nor, the Louisiana Secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals, and the
1998]
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and a list of non-lead free drinking water coolers to educational
agencies, schools and day care centers.18 Section 1464(d) requires
that each state establish a remedial action program in the interest
of attaining the objectives of LCCA. 19 In response, the State of Lou-
isiana distributed an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Fact
Sheet to local educational agencies, schools and day care centers
which listed electric drinking water coolers that were not lead-free
as of February 1990.20
ACORN then filed suit against Louisiana, alleging its failure to
establish a remedial action program as required under section
1464(d).21 After concluding that Louisiana's distribution of the
EPA Fact Sheet did not satisfy the requirements of section 1464(c),
ACORN amended its complaint to also include an allegation of
Louisiana's violation of that section. 22 Following the district court's
dismissal of its suit as moot, ACORN successfully moved for an
award of attorneys' fees and other expenses pursuant to the citizen
suit provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA).23
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, Louisiana challenged the district court's award of attorneys'
Administrator of the Safe Drinking Water Program of the Louisiana Department
of Health and Hospitals. See id.
18. For the pertinent text of section 1464(c) of LCCA, see infra note 37.
19. For the pertinent text of section 1464(d) of LCCA, see infra note 37.
20. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1389. The Fifth Circuit did not specify the amount
of time that elapsed between ACORN's sending the "Notice of Intent to File Suit"
and Louisiana's distribution of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Fact
Sheet. See id.
21. See id. at 1389-90.
22. See id. at 1390. In its original complaint, ACORN alleged only Louisiana's
violation of section 1464(d) of LCCA. See id. at 1391. When ACORN filed suit, it
was unsure whether Louisiana's distribution of the EPA Fact Sheet, rather than the
list EPA published in the January 18, 1990 Federal Register, constituted compli-
ance with section 1464(c). See id. After independently determining that Louisiana
was not in compliance with section 1464(c), ACORN amended its complaint to
include an allegation of Louisiana's violation of that section. See id. Nine months
after ACORN instituted suit, Louisiana distributed the list of non-lead free drink-
ing water coolers published in the Federal Register. See id. The EPA Fact Sheet
Louisiana originally distributed was actually more comprehensive than the Federal
Register list, as it contained all of the brands and models that list included, plus
seven others. See id. at n.9.
23. See id. at 1390. Under the citizen suit provision of the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974, "[t] he court ... may award costs of litigation (including reason-
able attorney and expert witness fees) to any party whenever the court determines
such an award is appropriate." Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 § 1449(d), Pub. L.
No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d)
(1994)) [hereinafter SDWA]. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's approach to
awarding attorneys' fees, see infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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fees to ACORN on several grounds, including, most significantly,
the constitutionality of sections 1464(c) and 1464(d).24
Noting it was unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of
section 1464(c), the Fifth Circuit determined that in distributing
the EPA Fact Sheet, Louisiana had complied with the requirements
of section 1464(c). 25 Louisiana contended that because it was not
in violation of section 1464(c) at the time ACORN instituted suit, it
was not liable for ACORN's attorneys' fees. 26 ACORN focused on
the meaning of the term "publish" in asserting that Louisiana did
not comply with that section until it disseminated the Federal Regis-
ter list over nine months after ACORN instituted suit.27 ACORN
further supported its claim of entitlement to attorneys' fees by con-
tending that its suit was the catalyst for Louisiana's compliance with
LCCA.28
The Fifth Circuit concluded that in promulgating section
1464(d), Congress overstepped its constitutional boundaries under
the Tenth Amendment, and therefore section 1464(d) was an im-
permissible intrusion upon Louisiana's state sovereignty.29 Based
24. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1390.
25. See id. at 1391. The Fifth Circuit stated that Louisiana's failure to comply
with the technical publication requirement of section 1464(c) did not amount to
non-compliance with the publication requirement of 1464(d). See id. For a discus-
sion of how the Fifth Circuit handled the section 1464(d) publication require-
ment, see infra note 27.
26. See id.
27. See id. ACORN argued that the term "publish," as used in sections
1464(a) and 1464(c), required publication in the Federal Register. See id. The
Fifth Circuit undertook its own analysis of the term since the legislative history for
LCCA is silent on the meaning or potential interpretation of the term "publish."
See id. at 1391-92.
The Fifth Circuit observed that neither section 1463(c) nor section 1464(c)
"unambiguously establishes how or where publication is to be made, nor do we
think we need attempt to do so." Id. at 1391. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted
that even if the term "publish" as used in those sections required publication in the
Federal Register, because the list Louisiana disseminated was more comprehensive
than that published in the Federal Register, "dissemination of the over-inclusive
Fact Sheet did not defile the purpose of the LCCA." Id. at 1391-92.
28. See id. at 1391. LCCA's legislative history does not address the meaning or
possible interpretations of "catalyst." For a discussion of courts' treatment of the
"catalyst" issue in the context of litigation surrounding awards of attorneys' fees,
see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
29. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394. In its constitutional assessment of section
1464(d), the Fifth Circuit applied the analysis the United States Supreme Court
undertook in New York v. United States. See id. at 1392-94. In New York, by invalidat-
ing the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, the
Court effectively limited congressional Commerce Clause power and reaffirmed
states' Tenth Amendment rights. See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). The Fifth Circuit in ACORN determined that in light of the New York
Court's determination that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to
1998] ACORN 483
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on ACORN's failure to establish Louisiana's violation of any lawful
requirements of LCCA at the time it instituted its suit, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and dismissed ACORN's
claims.30
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988
Congress's enactment of LCCA reflected its strong concern for
the health of the nation's children. 31 After considering the alarm-
ingly high rate of lead poisoning among children and determining
that lead in drinking water posed a substantial risk to children's
health, Congress concluded that legislation regulating electric
drinking water coolers would be an effective means of decreasing
lead ingestion by children.3 2 Although Congress had previously
compel states' enactment or administration of federal regulatory programs, sec-
tion 1464(d) was unconstitutional. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394.
30. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1395.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1041, at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3793-94 (describing LCCA as providing "programs intended to help reduce lead
contamination in drinking water, especially for children") (emphasis added).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1041, at 5-8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3793-96.
Congress noted:
According to the [EPA], every year more than 241,000 children
under age 6 are exposed to lead in drinking water at levels high enough
to impair their intellectual development. The National Health and Nutri-
tion Survey, published in 1982, found that 9.1 percent of America's pre-
school children - a total of 1.5 million children under age 6 - have
lead levels that meet the U.S. Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) defini-
tion of acute lead poisoning.
A 1986 EPA study lists the health problems that could be avoided if
lead levels in tap water were reduced to the level of the proposed stan-
dard then under consideration (20 parts per billion). The study finds
that in addition to the 241,000 children at risk of mental impairment,
each year some 680,000 expectant mothers in the United States are ex-
posed to lead levels in drinking water high enough to be associated with
miscarriage, low birth weight and retarded growth and development of
the fetus.
The EPA also concludes that some 82,000 school children each year
are at risk of growth impairment, and another 82,000 are at risk of effects
on their blood cell formation.
H.R. REP. No. 100-1041, at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3794.
In particular, Congress asserted its concern for safe drinking water in schools
by highlighting the widespread use of electric drinking water coolers in the United
States' schools. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1041, at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3798. Congress provided three reasons in support of its concern: 1) Water use
patterns in schools, which are characterized by long standing periods of non-use;
2) the prevalence of leachable lead sites, such as lead-soldered joints, in electric
drinking water coolers and plumbing in schools; and 3) the potential of a single
lead contaminated electric drinking water cooler to affect a large number of its
users. See id. (citing UNITED STATES PUBuc HEALTH SERVICE, AGENCY FOR Toxic
6
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ACORN
taken several steps toward reducing the likelihood of individuals'
exposure to the harmful effects of lead,33 LCCA was the first nar-
rowly focused attempt by Congress to limit children's exposure to
lead contaminated drinking water.34 Essentially, LCCA provides for
comprehensive federal regulation of lead levels in drinking water
by: (1) mandating the recall of drinking water coolers with lead-
lined reservoir tanks;35 (2) banning the manufacture and sale of
non-lead free drinking water coolers;3 6 and (3) establishing guide-
SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, THE NATURE AND ExTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN
CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS Vol. 1, at vi-12 (1988)).
33. See, e.g., SDWA § 1401, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (regulating drinking water stan-
dards and safety); Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 91-695,
84 Stat. 2079 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-46 (1994)) (ban-
ning lead in paint); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994)) (addressing emission standard for hazard-
ous air pollutants); Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1994)) (mandating establishment of toxic
and pretreatment effect standards).
34. See Thomas J. Douglas, Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 - History and Cri-
tique, 5 ENVrL. Arr. 501, 504 (1976) (describing SDWA as significant congressional
attempt to regulate lead contamination in drinking water). Congressional regula-
tion of drinking water dates back to the establishment of the Public Health Service
Hygienic Laboratory as a center for the investigation of waterborne infectious and
contagious diseases. See id. Beginning in 1914, the Public Health Service set stan-
dards for drinking water, which it revised periodically. See id. For a historical over-
view and analysis of SDWA, see Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates
and the "New (New) Federalism" Devolution, Revolution, or Reform? 81 MINN. L. REv.
97, 197-99 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21
WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 233, 23741 (1997).
35. See LCCA § 1462, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-22 (1994). Under section 1462, "all
drinking water coolers identified by the [EPA] Administrator on the list under
section 1463 as having a lead-lined tank shall be considered to be imminently haz-
ardous consumer products .... ." Id.
36. See LCCA § 1463, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-23. Section 1463 reads:
(a) Publication of Lists
The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public
comment, identify each brand and model of drinking water cooler which
is not lead free, including each brand and model of drinking water cooler
which has a lead-lined tank. For purposes of identifying the brand and
model of drinking water coolers under this subsection, the Administrator
shall use the best information available to the [EPA]. Within 100 days
after [October 31, 1988], the Administrator shall publish a list of each
brand and model of drinking water cooler identified under this subsec-
tion. Such list shall separately identify each brand and model of cooler
which has a lead-lined tank. The Administrator shall continue to gather
information regarding lead in drinking water coolers and shall revise and
republish the list from time to time as may be appropriate as new infor-
mation or analysis becomes available regarding lead contamination in
drinking water coolers.
(b) Prohibition
No person may sell in interstate commerce, or manufacture for sale
in interstate commerce, any drinking water cooler listed under subsec-
tion (a) or any other drinking water cooler which is not lead free, includ-
ing a lead-lined drinking water cooler.
1998]
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lines regarding local educational agencies' management of lead
contaminated drinking water.37 LCCA's effectiveness in fostering
Id.
For EPA's list of non-lead free drinking water coolers as of January 1990, see
Drinking Water Coolers That Are Not Lead Free, 55 Fed. Reg. 1,772 (1990).
37. See LCCA § 1464, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24. Section 1464 provides:
(a) Distribution of Drinking Water Cooler List.
Within 100 days after [October 31, 1988], the Administrator shall
distribute to the States a list of each brand and model of drinking water
cooler identified and listed by the Administrator under section 1463 (a).
(b) Guidance Document and Testing Protocol.
The Administrator shall publish a guidance document and a testing
protocol to assist schools in determining the source and degree of lead
contamination in school drinking water supplies and in remedying such
contamination. The guidance document shall include guidelines for
sample preservation. The guidance document shall also include gui-
dance to assist States, schools, and the general public in ascertaining the
levels of lead contamination in drinking water coolers and in taking ap-
propriate action to reduce or eliminate such contamination. The gui-
dance document shall contain a testing protocol for the identification of
drinking water coolers which contribute to lead contamination in drink-
ing water. Such document and protocol may be revised, republished and
redistributed as the Administrator deems necessary. The Administrator
shall distribute the guidance document and testing protocol to the States
within 100 days after [October 31, 1988].
(c) Dissemination to Schools, Etc.
Each State shall provide for the dissemination to local educational
agencies, private non-profit elementary or secondary schools and to day
care centers of the guidance document and testing protocol published
under subsection (b), together with the list of drinking water coolers pub-
lished under section 1463 (a).
(d) Remedial Action Program
(1) Testing and Remedying Lead Contamination.
Within 9 months after [October 31, 1988], each State shall es-
tablish a program, consistent with this section, to assist local educa-
tional agencies in testing for, and remedying, lead contamination in
drinking water from coolers and from other sources of lead contami-
nation at schools under the jurisdiction of such agencies.
(2) Public Availability.
A copy of the results of any testing under paragraph (1) shall be
available in the administrative offices of the local educational agency
for inspection by the public, including teachers, other school person-
nel, and parents. The local educational agency shall notify parent,
teacher, and employee organizations of the availability of such test-
ing results.
(3) Coolers.
In the case of drinking water coolers, such program shall in-
clude measures for the reduction or elimination of lead contamina-
tion from those water coolers which are not lead free and which are
located in schools. Such measures shall be adequate to ensure that
within 15 months after [October 31, 1988], all such water coolers in
schools under the jurisdiction of such agencies are repaired, re-
placed, permanently removed, or rendered inoperable unless the
cooler is tested and found . . . not to contribute lead to drinking
water.
8
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the development of a healthier American youth has been con-
tested, and remains debatable. 38
B. Judicial Treatment of LCCA
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
heard arguments similar to those raised in ACORNwhen it decided
Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Romer.39 In Romer, the Colorado
Environmental Coalition (CEC) filed suit against the State of Colo-
rado to force its compliance with LCCA sections 1461 through
1465.40 CEC specifically sought orders and schedules compelling
Colorado to distribute certain guidance documents and lists and to
establish remedial programs for day care centers within the state.4 1
Relying on section 1449(d) of SDWA, CEC also moved for recovery
of the attorneys' fees it incurred in its suit against Romer. 42
The Romer court focused on several factors in assessing CEC's
entitlement to recovery under section 1449(d) and in determining
an appropriate compensatory award. 43 The court first examined
the language of section 1449(d), which allows courts to award attor-
neys' fees on a discretionary basis. 44 The court made two critical
For EPA's recommended guidelines for implementation of programs in
schools to remedy lead contamination in their drinking water systems, see Gui-
dance Document and Testing Protocol To Assist Schools in Determining the
Source and Degree of Lead Contamination in School Drinking Water Supplies
and Remedying Such Contamination, 54 Fed. Reg. 14,316 (1989).
38. See Reiss, supra note 4, at 293 (observing that LCCA mandates only report-
ing of testing results, and not testing itself, and asserting that "[i]f lead in drinking
water is to be significantly reduced in schools and day care centers, legislation must
make testing mandatory and must ensure that local educational agencies and day
care centers do in fact test their water").
For a discussion of the congressional intent and reasoning behind LCCA, see
H.R. REP. No. 100-1041 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3793.
39. 796 F. Supp. 457 (D. Colo. 1992).
40. See id. at 458.
41. See id. Pursuant to 1449(d), the Colorado Environmental Coalition
(CEC) sent notice on January 30, 1992 to the State of Colorado that it was in
violation of LCCA. See id. Following the 60 day mandatory waiting period, CEC
filed suit on April 2, 1992. See id. During those 60 days, the parties engaged in
extensive negotiations. See id. This led to the formation of a consent decree
which, in addition to the exact relief CEC sought in its complaint, imposed duties
upon the State of Colorado which were not specified under LCCA. See id. at 458-
59.
42. See id. at 458-61. The consent decree the parties had entered into left
open the question of attorneys' fees. See id. at 459.
43. See id. at 459-61. The district court specifically considered both whether
CEC was the prevailing party as well as whether its institution of suit was the cata-
lyst for Romer's compliance with LCCA. See id. at 459-60. For a discussion of these
factors, see infra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
44. See Romer, 796 F. Supp. at 459. For the pertinent text of section 1449(d) of
SDWA, see supra note 23. For an outline of how federal courts treat the issue of
1998]
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observations, namely, that CEC was the prevailing party in the
suit,45 and that CEC's institution of the suit was the catalyst for Col-
orado's acquiescence. 46 Based on these factors, the court con-
cluded that CEC was entitled to its litigation costs. 47 The court
undertook a reasonableness analysis to determine the amount of
these costs, and held Colorado liable to CEC for reimbursement of
all of its legal fees.48
attorneys' fees, see Laura B. Bartell, Awards of Attorneys'Fees by the Federal Courts (Part
1), 6 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALSJ. No. 5, at 95 (Apr. 1982); Laura B. Bartell,
Awards of Attorneys'Fees by the Federal Courts (Part 2), 6 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERI-
ALsJ. No. 6, at 63 (June 1982); Laura B. Bartell, Awards of Attorneys'Fees by the Federal
Courts (Part 3), 7 A.L.I.-A.B.A COURSE MATERiALS J. No. 1, at 77 (Aug. 1982).
45. See Romer, 796 F. Supp. at 459. The Romercourt stated, "[h]ere, plaintiff is
clearly the substantially prevailing party. Plaintiffs complaint set out two specific
requests for relief, both of which were achieved precisely and completely by the
consent decree and order." Id. For a discussion of concepts relevant to the notion
of "prevailing parties," see Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978) (holding plaintiffs may be deemed "prevailing" for purposes of awarding
attorneys' fees if "they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit"); Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (citing Nadeau, 581 F.2d at
275); Ruckelhaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) (requiring claimant achieve
some success before deemed "prevailing," and therefore entitled to award of attor-
neys' fees); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (citing Nadeau, 581 F.2d at
275); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing "[a] plaintiff may prevail in the absence of a judicial determination on the
merits ... [by showing] '(1) that [the] lawsuit is causally linked to securing the
relief obtained, and (2) that the defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit
was required by law'") (citations omitted).
46. See Romer, 796 F. Supp. at 459. The Romer court commented that the State
of Colorado had been in violation of LCCA for close to three years when Romer
sent its notice of violations letter. See id. The State of Colorado entered into settle-
ment negotiations upon receiving this letter and learning of Romer's intent to file
suit upon expiration of the 60 day period. See id. Regarding the catalyst issue, the
Romer court noted that litigation does not begin on the day that a complaint is
filed, but when a plaintiff sends the statutorily required letter and threatens to
bring a citizen suit. See id.; see also Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 352, 353
(10th Cir. 1989) (noting "the sequence of events . . . strongly indicates that the
plaintiffs suit was, at the very least, a significant catalyst or substantial factor in
causing defendants to change their policy").
47. See Romer, 796 F. Supp. at 460.
48. See id.; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (providing formula for computation
of "reasonable" attorneys' fees). The Hensley Court stated:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reason-
able fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an ob-
jective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's
services. The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence sup-
porting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation
of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award
accordingly.
Id. The Hensley Court added that "the most critical factor is the degree of success
obtained .... There is no precise rule or formula for making these determina-
tions.... The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment."
10
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C. Constitutional Considerations: The Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment
1. The Commerce Clause
The framers of the Constitution created the scheme of enu-
merated powers which has, in large part, dictated the course of the
United States' political evolution.49 Of paramount importance to
this scheme is the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate trade. 50 Initially, the Commerce Clause achieved
the necessary reorganization of the interstate commercial infra-
structure. 51 The varied judicial interpretations of the Commerce
Clause that have emerged since its creation are largely attributable
Id. at 436-37; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 (1986) (noting "for the time spent pursuing optional admin-
istrative proceedings properly to be included in the calculation of a reasonable
attorney's fee, the work must be 'useful and of a type ordinarily necessary' to se-
cure the final result obtained from the litigation") (quoting Webb v. Board of
Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)); see generally Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154 (1990) (emphasizing utility of treating case as whole, rather than series of
individual issues and events, in determining reasonable attorneys' fees); Ramos v.
Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983) (outlining process for determination of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees).
In support of its judgment entitling CEC to all of its legal fees, the Romer court
analyzed the timing of CEC's institution of its suit and Colorado's reaction to
CEC's claims. See Romer, 796 F. Supp. at 459-60. Concluding that CEC should not
be penalized simply because its actions forced Colorado's compliance with LCCA's
provisions before CEC filed its complaint, the Romer court noted that "plaintiffs
action was the catalyst for defendant's acquiescence .... [A] plaintiff who forces
compliance with the mandate of Congress should not be penalized because a de-
fendant bows to the inevitable before the complaint is even filed." Id.
49. See Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the
Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (1996). For a detailed record of the
debates of the Constitutional Convention, see JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (E.H. Scott, ed., Scott, Foresman & Co. 1893); CATH-
ERINE DINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (Little, Brown & Co. eds., 4th ed.
1986) (providing narrative analysis of Constitutional Convention).
50. For the pertinent text of the Commerce Clause, see supra note 9. For one
commentator's text-based analysis of the framers' intent in enacting the Com-
merce Clause, as well as the Court's continually changing interpretation of it, see
Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695
(1996); Peter A. Lauricella, Comment, The Real "Contract With America"." The Origi-
nal Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1377,
1398-1400 (1997) (discussing significance of Commerce Clause).
51. See Lauricella, supra note 50, at 1397. In the years leading up to the Con-
stitutional Convention, commerce between the states under the Articles of Confed-
eration had become chaotic, as each state had constructed trade barriers to protect
their respective citizens' business interests. See id.
4891998] ACORN
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to the limiting effects the Tenth Amendment has on congressional
power. 52
2. The Tenth Amendment
Post-Constitutional Convention federalist-antifederalist debates
over the delegation of legislative authority among the federal and
state governments led to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. 53
While the first eight amendments establish many fundamental civil
liberties, the Tenth Amendment limits the scope of congressional
authority.54 The precise limitations the Tenth Amendment has on
the federal government's powers are still undefined after two centu-
52. For the text of the Tenth Amendment, see supra note 10. For a discussion
of the Court's varied interpretation of the Commerce Clause in light of the Tenth
Amendment, see infra notes 57-94 and accompanying text.
53. SeeJohn R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment
Since United States v. Darby, 27 CumB. L. REV. 445, 449 (1996-97). Federalists fa-
vored the establishment of a strong national government, while antifederalists
sought a greater delegation of power among the states. See id. Expressing federal-
ism's fundamental principles, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "[iut may be said that it
would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it
to absorb those residuary authorities which it might be judged proper to leave with
the States for local purposes .... THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
For a collection of the documents which supported the Constitutional Conven-
tion's major debates, see FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds.,
Madison House, 1st ed. 1989).
One author, providing a summary discussion of each of the Bill of Rights,
comments:
There are several reasons a bill of rights was not included in the
Constitution. The most important was the drafters' belief that additional
protections to those provided in the Constitution were not necessary.
The Bill of Rights was born in controversy and continues to be the
primary legal battleground for some of the most emotional social, polit-
ical, and legal issues of our time because it is a statement of the most
fundamental personal rights of mankind.
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, The Bill of Rights - Its Origins and Its Keepers, 18
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 187, 188-92 (1991). For commentary on the Bill of Rights play-
ing three roles, including securing passage of the Constitution, redefining Ameri-
can federalism over the past century, and restructuring modern society through
redefinition of the contemporary limits of community power, see Richard G. Wil-
kins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYUJ. PUB. L. 525 (1992); Kermit L.
Hall, The Bill of Rights, Liberty, and Original Intent, in CRUCIBLE OF LIBERTY, 8 (Ray-
mond Arsenault ed., The Free Press 1991) (arguing tensions historically surround-
ing interpretation of Bill of Rights are exactly what framers intended); Maeva
Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 115 (1992)
(detailing formation, adoption and importance of Bill of Rights).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. For the text of the Tenth Amendment, see
supra note 10. "The Tenth Amendment was incorporated into the Bill of Rights
because of the Anti-Federalists' concern that the Constitution would make the na-
tional government too powerful and could ultimately eliminate state sovereignty."
Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New
York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 99, 102 (1995).
12
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ries. 55  Constitutional scholars agree, however, that the Tenth
Amendment establishes a degree of complementarity between fed-
eral and state legislative authority.56
D. Judicial Treatment of the Commerce Clause-Tenth
Amendment Conflict
The dual existence of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment illustrates the framers' intention that the Constitution
create a balance between the conflicting interests of forming a
strong national government and protecting state sovereignty. 57
The historical interplay between these two provisions comports with
the theoretical debates which have long surrounded the notion of
"federalism. '58 Additionally, the relationship between the Com-
For a discussion of the civil liberties the first eight amendments guarantee in
the context of modem societal trends and experiences, see ERIc NEISSER, RECAP-
TURING THE SPIRIT (Madison House Publishers 1991). For a thorough discussion of
the Ninth Amendment, see Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amend-
ment, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 61 (1996).
55. See Ching, supra note 54, at 140. "The United States Constitution was
drafted by people of diverse beliefs. . . . The Tenth Amendment, which was
thought to ensure the protection of the states' rights, is itself dependent on the
interpretation of the original Constitution . .. ." Id. For examples of different
interpretations of the Tenth Amendment, see Kathryn Abrams, Comment, On
Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 723 (1984) (supporting struc-
tural analysis of Tenth Amendment); Lauricella, supra note 50 (supporting inter-
pretation of Tenth Amendment based on framers' original intent); Vile, supra note
53 (arguing against literal reading of Tenth Amendment).
56. See Abrams, supra note 55, at 737. "The states may not exercise the powers
delegated to the federal government .... Moreover, the federal government may
not exercise the powers properly reserved to the states." Id.
57. See Ching, supra note 54, at 102. One commentator describes the evolu-
tion of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment as nearly symbiotic, ob-
serving that "[slince much of the early expansion of the national government's
powers dealt with the Commerce Clause, which delegated to the national govern-
ment broad power to regulate commerce among the states, the evolution of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is, in many ways, the evolution of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence." Id. at 103. For an illustration of Justice O'Connor's comparable
view on the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amend-
ment, see infra note 59.
58. One author defines federalism as "relationships [which] emphasize part-
nership between individuals, groups and governments; cooperative relationships
that make the partnership real; and negotiations among the partners as the basis
for sharing power." Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
65, 69 (Daphne A. Kenyon &John Kincaid eds., 1991). A second author highlights
four values of federalism: (1) states' ability to check the oppressive power of a
strong central government; (2) states' ability to draw citizens into the political pro-
cess; (3) the political and cultural diversity independent state governments pro-
vide; and (4) the states' existence as "'[laboratories]' that may 'try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
1998]
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merce Clause and the Tenth Amendment has been a constant and
controversial subject of court decisions.59 Although policy-based
approaches to silencing these debates have developed, such as cen-
tralization and decentralization, "the task of ascertaining the consti-
tutional line between the federal and states' power has given rise to
many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases."60
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1988) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932)); but see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994) (criticizing federalism proponents'
support of states as self-governing units and promoting centralization of power in
federal government). Two authors comment:
We Americans love [our] federalism .... It conjures up images of Fourth
of July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family
farms with tire swings in the front yard. . . . In fact, federalism is
America's neurosis.... But our political culture is essentially healthy,
and we do not let our neuroses control us. Instead, we have been trying
to extricate ourselves from federalism for at least the past 130 years.
Id. at 906-08.
For a discussion and history of federalism as it relates specifically to environ-
mental issues, see Robert J. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1141-71 (1995) (observing growth of
federal environmental regulation has brought national environmental policy to
forefront of recent federalism debates).
59. For a discussion of the cases leading up to ACORN which involved the
resolution of conflicts between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment,
see infra notes 61-94 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor, noting the intertwined nature of the relationship between
the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, commented in New York v.
United States
In a case like [this], involving the division between federal and state gov-
ernments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is
delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment ex-
pressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is
an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.
505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). Again referring to the conflict between the Commerce
Clause and Tenth Amendment, Justice O'Connor similarly commented:
mJust as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference
whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of ascertain-
ing the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under
the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the
core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.
Either way, we must determine whether [a provision] . . . oversteps the
boundary between federal and state authority.
Id. at 159.
60. Id. at 155. For a detailed discussion of centralization and decentralization
in the context of environmental policy, as well as a proposal that centralization is
the optimal means of resolving the longstanding conflict surrounding federal and
state governments' respective rights, see infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the difficulty of delineating the authority of the federal and
state governments, see Ann Marie Bereschak, Note, New York v. United States:
Breathing Life Back Into the Tenth Amendment? 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 509 (1993).
14
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1. The Early Years of the Commerce Clause-Tenth Amendment
Conflict
McCulloch v. Maryland6 was the first, and arguably the most
important, of the Court's decisions regarding the Constitution's di-
vision of power between the federal government and the states. 62
In McCulloch, the Court addressed Maryland's power to impose a
tax on the Baltimore branch of the federally unchartered Bank of
the United States. 63 The Court rejected Maryland's argument that
Congress unconstitutionally created a national bank, and unani-
mously declared that Maryland's imposition of a tax infringed upon
congressional power.64
Five years later in Gibbons v. Ogden,65 the Court reinforced and
expanded McCulloch's notion of a strong national government. 66
After examining the conflict between New York's grant of an exclu-
sive navigation license to certain ships and an existing federal law
61. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
62. See Vile, supra note 53, at 452. "Of all the cases that have affected subse-
quent understandings of the Tenth Amendment, none has been more important
than the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland. Appropriately, it has been called 'the
first in importance and in the place it holds in the development of the American
Constitution.'" Id. (quoting ALBERTJ. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARsHALL 282
(1916)); see also Kerry Bagnall, Comment, Regulatory Federalism and Its Impact on
State Sovereignty, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 561, 564 (1986) (describing McCulloch as
Court's seminal statement on federal power). Three years prior to McCulloch, in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court described constitutional questions as being "of
great importance and delicacy." 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
63. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 317-21. The McCulloch Court posed
the question of "whether, if the bank be constitutionally created, the State govern-
ments have power to tax it?" Id. at 326. The Court continued by observing that
.the constitution itself, and the laws passed in pursuance of its provisions, shall be
the supreme law of the land, and shall control all State legislation and State constitu-
tions, which may be incompatible therewith .... " Id. at 326-27 (emphasis added).
64. See id. at 421-26. The McCulloch Court stated:
We admit ... that the powers of the [federal] government are limited
.... But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate ... are
constitutional.
Id. In holding that Maryland's imposition of a tax infringed on congressional
power, the McCulloch Court reasoned that although the Constitution empowers
both state and federal governments to impose taxes, "such is the paramount char-
acter of the constitution, that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the action
of even this power, is admitted." Id. at 425.
65. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
66. See id. at 105. For a discussion of federalism, the emphasis of which is a
strong national government, see supra note 58.
1998] 493
15
Galligan: Acorn v. Edwards: Did the Fifth Circuit Squirrel Away States' Ten
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
494 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 479
on the licensing of coastal trade, the Gibbons Court held that federal
law preempts state law in the area of interstate commerce. 67
After several decades of inconsistent holdings, the Court in
Hammer v. Dagenhart68 began a shift toward recognition of states'
rights by invalidating a federal act which prohibited the interstate
transportation of goods produced through child labor. 69 Following
a decision signaling a return to a broad construction of congres-
sional Commerce Clause power, 70 however, the Court overruled
Hammer in United States v. Darby.71 Holding that certain minimum
wage and maximum hours requirements of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 (FLSA) were valid, the Darby Court virtually elimi-
nated states' Tenth Amendment rights. 7 2
67. See id. at 182. Following a description of the facts of Gibbons, the Court
posed the following:
On these pleadings the substantial question is raised: Are these laws such
as the Legislature of New York had a right to pass? If so, do they, sec-
ondly, in their operation, interfere with any right enjoyed under the con-
stitution [sic] and laws of the United States, and are they, therefore, void,
as far as such interference extends?
Id. at 8.
68. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
69. See id. at 277. The holding in Hammer has been described as the "zenith of
states' rights" because it effectively halted the expansion of congressional Com-
merce Clause power. See Ching, supra note 54, at 107.
70. See National Labor Relations Bd. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1936). In NLRB, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, which
regulates unfair labor practices, reasoning that "[a]though activities may be intra-
state in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and sub-
stantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce ... Congress cannot be denied the power to
exercise that control." Id. at 37. One author describes the Court's opinion in
NLRB as the beginning of a four-decade long period of deference to Congress. See
Karol L. Kahalley, Note, State Sovereignty - Back to the Future: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms State Sovereignty in Cooperative Federalism Solutions to Environmental Problems,
29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 117, 123 (1994).
71. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
72. See Vile, supra note 53, at 458. The Darby Court clearly expressed its view
regarding the significance of the Tenth Amendment, noting that it "states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the
history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relation-
ship between the national and state governments as it had been established.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
In Fry v. United States, where the validity of federal wage and salary freezes was
at issue, the Court once again endorsed congressional intrusion into state activities
supported by its Commerce Clause power. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
544-47 (1975). In his dissenting opinion in Fry, Justice Rehnquist extracted from a
line of preceding cases a trend of increased congressional Commerce Clause
power and surmised that "the danger to our federal system which is emphasized by
these [cases] ... seems to me quite manifest. The Tenth Amendment, the Court's
opinion in this case insists, does have meaning; but the critical question is how
16
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Thirty-five years later, however, the Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery,73 again addressing FLSA, set forth a contrary view
regarding state sovereignty.74 The Court in National League of Cities
reverted to a broad interpretation of states' Tenth Amendment
rights by holding the 1974 amendments to FLSA unconstitutional
on the grounds that they would impermissibly interfere with the
integral functions of state and local governments. 75 The National
League of Cities decision, reading the Tenth Amendment as an af-
firmative limit on congressional power, 'jolted congressional com-
placency and has been largely responsible for the rebirth of
modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence." 76 For example, draw-
ing upon its decision in National League of Cities, the Court in Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n7 7 affirmed Congress's
Commerce Clause power and established a three-part test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of congressional actions. 78
much meaning is left to it and the basic constitutional principles it illumines." Id.
at 550 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 851. The National League of Cities Court described the areas the
FLSA amendments targeted as "typical of those performed by state and local gov-
ernments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and
furnishing public services." Id. In addition, the Court stated, "[i]f Congress may
withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment
decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest,
we think there would be little left of the States' [independent existence]." Id.
(footnote and citation omitted).
76. Vile, supra note 53, at 487.
77. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
78. See id. 277-78. The Hodel Court held that requiring states to either adopt
minimum federal standards governing strip mining or to submit to a federal plan
was permissible under the Commerce Clause and did not violate states' Tenth
Amendment rights. See id. at 293. The Hodel Court drew upon the National League
of Cities decision in establishing a test for determining the constitutionality of con-
gressional actions. SeeJeffrey B. Teichert, Note, New York v. United States: Consti-
tutional Order or Commerce Clause Chaos? 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 377, 378 (1993). Hodel
requires the following to show that congressional commerce power legislation is
invalid: 1) a showing that the statute at issue attempts to regulate the States as
states; 2) that the statute address matters regarding state sovereignty; and 3) that it
be apparent that states' compliance with the statute would hinder their abilities to
perform traditional governmental functions. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88. The
Hodel Court added that even if a party satisfies these three requirements, "[t ] here
are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such
that it justifies state submission" Id. at 288 n.29 (citing National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 852-53; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)).
In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi (EERC), the Court ex-
panded its Hodel decision by expressly deferring to a congressional finding in its
consideration of whether Congress enacted legislation within the confines of its
Commerce Clause power. See 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982). In FERC, Mississippi chal-
lenged the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 as an unconstitutional
19981
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Several years later, however, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority abandoned the broad construction of
federal legislative authority it had adopted in National League of Cit-
ies.79 The Garcia Court questioned whether the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of FLSA applied to a public mass-transit author-
ity.80 Holding the provisions applicable, the Garcia Court reasoned
that state interests were fairly represented at the federal level
through the states' selection of individuals to fulfill the responsibili-
ties the Constitution bestows upon both the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the federal government.8 ' The Court expressly
disapproved of the National League of Cities Court's attempt to de-
fine the scope of state regulatory authority through consideration
of "'areas of traditional [state] functions."' 8 2 Instead, the Court
extension of congressional Commerce Clause power, arguing that it infringed
upon an area traditionally controlled by the states. See id. at 752. Justice
O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part in FERC, voiced her concern
over the Court's treatment of states' Tenth Amendment rights, observing:
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the na-
tional bureaucracy .... Instead, each State is sovereign within its own
domain, governing its citizens and providing for their general welfare.
While the Constitution and federal statutes define the boundaries of that
domain, they do not harness state powers for national purposes.
Id. at 777; see also United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 687
(1982) (noting "U]ust as the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state
functions, there is no justification for a rule which would allow the States, by ac-
quiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to erode federal au-
thority in areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation"); see also Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (hold-
ing provision of 1974 amendments to Age Discrimination Act of 1957 invalid be-
cause although "the Act [required] the State to achieve its goals in a more
individualized and careful manner than would otherwise be the case ... it does not
require the State to abandon these goals, or to abandon the public policy decisions
underlying them").
79. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31. The
Garcia Court stated, "[a] lthough National League of Cities supplied some examples
of 'traditional government functions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how
a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished from a 'nontraditional' one." Id.
80. See id. at 533. The conflict in Garcia arose after the Wage and Hour Ad-
ministration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion stating thai San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Association's (SAMTA) operations were subject to
the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements. See id. at 534. SAMTA
sought preclusion of FLSA's provisions under the Court's National League of Cities
decision. See id.
81. See id. at 551. For the Constitution's delegation of electoral and represen-
tative powers to the states, see U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; art. II, § 1; art. V. Discuss-
ing the qualities of a federal government, James Madison stated, "[ii t is sufficient
to such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either di-
rectly, or indirectly, by the people .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
82. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
The Garcia Court criticized this criterion by noting that "[t]hus far, this Court itself
has made little headway in defining the scope of governmental functions deemed
protected under National League of Cities." Id. at 539. The Garcia Court further
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identified the national political process, rather than the courtroom,
as the proper forum for determining states' rights. 83 Following Gar-
cia, the Court made a preliminary shift back to a confirmation of
states' Tenth Amendment rights. 8 4 Then, in New York v. United
States,85 the Court limited Congress's Commerce Clause power to
the direct regulation of interstate commerce, as opposed to the reg-
ulation of state governments' oversight of interstate commerce. 86
2. From New York v. United States to the Present
In New York, the Court addressed New York State's challenge of
three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 (Waste Amendments) as unconstitutional under
both the Constitution's Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amend-
noted that "[a]ny rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,'
or 'necessary' nature of governmental function inevitably invites an unelected fed-
eral judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which it
dislikes." Id. at 546.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor expressed her fundamental disa-
greement with the majority opinion in Garcia, and stressed the need for a reconsid-
eration of the Court's treatment of federalism. See id. at 581 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "[i]f federalism so conceived and so care-
fully cultivated by the Framers of our Constitution is to remain meaningful, this
Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Gov-
ernment's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the
States." Id. Justice O'Connor opined that federalism ought to be based on the
notion that "the States as States have legitimate interests which the National Gov-
ernment is bound to respect even though its laws are supreme." Id. Echoing this
point, one author observes that "[t]he majority in Garcia, again, temporarily rele-
gated the Tenth Amendment to the status of mere window dressing." Ching, supra
note 54, at 114.
83. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. Several years after its Garcia decision, the
Court reiterated that the Tenth Amendment imposes structural, not substantive,
limits on states. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
84. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Gregory, a state constitu-
tional provision mandating the retirement of state court judges at age 70 con-
flicted with the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as applied
to the states. See id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stressed the dual
system of state sovereignty created under the Constitution when rationalizing the
Court's decision that the ADEA did not apply to state court judges. See id. at 455-
66. Justice O'Connor noted that the "federalist structure of joint sovereigns pre-
serves to the people numerous advantages .... Perhaps the principal benefit of
[which] is a check on abuses of government power." Id. at 458. For a critical
discussion of the Court's rationale in Gregory, see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 58, at
104-07.
85. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
86. See id. at 166. One critic comments that "[g]iven the close division of the
Court in Garcia and the stridency of the dissenting opinions, few observers could
have expected... [Garcia] to be the Court's final word either on the subject of the
Tenth Amendment (and more general issues of federalism) or on federal com-
merce powers." Vile, supra note 53, at 499.
19981
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ment.8 7 The Court relied upon its decisions in Hodel and Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi in response to New York's
allegation that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause power
in enacting these provisions. 88 The New York Court upheld the first
two Waste Amendments provisions, but held the third provision in-
valid under the Tenth Amendment.89 The Court concluded that
87. See 505 U.S. at 149. Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (Waste Amendments) to strengthen the Low-Level
Radioactive Policy Act of 1980 (Waste Act), which handled low-level radioactive
waste disposal ineffectively. SeeJulius Pohlenz, Note, New York v. United States -
Invalidation of the Take Title Provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 and its Consequences, 7 TUL. ENVrTL. L.J. 221, 221 (1993). For con-
gressional expression of the need for the enactment of the Waste Act, see S. REP.
No. 95-548 (1980), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6933. For congressional expres-
sion of, and reasoning behind the need to amend the Waste Act, see H.R. REP. No.
99-314, pt. 1 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2975.
Each of the three Waste Amendments provisions New York challenged uses
certain incentives to encourage the states to comply with their statutory obligation
to arrange for the disposal of waste generated within their borders. See New York,
505 U.S. at 152. Under the Waste Amendments, " [e ] ach State shall be responsible
for providing, either by itself, or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal
of... low-level radioactive waste generated within the State .... " Id. at 151. The
first of the challenged provisions offers the states monetary incentives, the second
offers access incentives and the third provision obligates the states to either comply
with their statutory obligations to properly dispose of the waste or to take title to it.
See id. at 152-54. These three provisions of the Waste Act have been described as
having "classified states as either good or bad depending on their actions in devel-
oping waste disposal sites." Ching, supra note 54, at 116. One commentator also
criticizes New York as encouraging disunity among the states and therefore contra-
vening the framers' intent that the Commerce Clause preserve the Union. See id.
For a full discussion of New York, including the legislative history of the Waste
Amendments, see Bereschak, supra note 60.
88. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62. The New York Court commented that the
decisions in FERC and Hodel "were not innovations. While Congress has substantial
powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the
States, the Constitution has never been understood to require the States to govern
according to Congress' instructions." Id. (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565
(1911)). The New York Court distinguished New York's argument that the manner
in which Congress attempted to regulate was unconstitutional from a potential
argument based on congressional authority to regulate in the field of low-level radi-
oactive waste. See id. at 159-60. In establishing the direction of its opinion and
pinpointing the crux of the New York controversy, the Court described the "litiga-
tion [as] concern [ing] the circumstances under which Congress may use the States
as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or otherwise
motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or in a particular way." Id. at
161.
89. See id. at 161-88. Emphasizing that the Constitution does not confer upon
Congress the ability to regulate the activities of the states as states, the Court sup-
ported the unconstitutionality of the take-title provision of the Waste Amendments
by observing that Congress "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from
coercion." Id. at 175.
The New York Court rejected the United States' argument that the Waste
Amendments gave the states wide latitude in implementing its provisions by con-
cluding that regardless of the number of alternative means of implementation
available to the states, the Waste Amendments did not allow states to decline ad-
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although the federal government has constitutional authority to
preempt state regulations that are contrary to federal interests and
provide incentives that encourage states' adoption of suggested reg-
ulatory schemes, Congress may not direct states to undertake spe-
cific actions within their own borders.90
Several years later, the Court similarly ruled in favor of state
rights in United States v. Lopez.91 At issue in Lopez was whether the
Commerce Clause authorized Congress to enact the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made possession of a firearm in a
school zone illegal. 92 The Lopez Court reasoned that Congress ex-
ceeded its Commerce Clause power because the Act neither regu-
lated a commercial activity nor required that possession of a
firearm be connected to interstate commerce.9 3 Lopez, therefore,
ministration of the program. See id. at 177. Under the Waste Amendments, there-
fore, "[n]o matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of
Congress." Id. The United States' three arguments against the Court's delineation
of congressional power, which the Court in turn rejected, were: 1) "the Constitu-
tion's prohibition of congressional directives to state governments can be over-
come where the federal interest is sufficiently important to justify state
submission"; 2) "the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal di-
rectives to state governments"; and 3) "the Constitution envisions a role for Con-
gress as an arbiter of interstate disputes." Id. at 177-79.
90. See id. at 188. The New York Court noted that "the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to gov-
ern according to Congress' instructions." Id. at 162.
91. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
92. See id. at 559. The conflict in Lopez, which arose after a high school stu-
dent was arrested and charged with carrying a firearm on school grounds, was
based on the section of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in which "Congress made it
a federal offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.'" Id. at
551 (quoting Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (1994)).
93. See id. at 567. Joining in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor observed the inconsistent course of the Court's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and emphasized the importance of acknowledging states' Tenth
Amendment rights by stating:
[The Gun-Free School Zones Act] forecloses the States from experi-
menting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay
claim by right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an
activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of
that term .... While the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as
severe in this instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases,
the intrusion is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger connection or
identification with commercial concerns that are central to the Com-
merce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Fram-
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represents the Court's implementation of definite limits on Con-
gress's power to legislate in the area of interstate commerce. 94
IV. NAArvE ANALYSIs
In ACORN, the Fifth Circuit focused on two issues raised on
appeal that the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
had decided in ACORN's favor.95 First, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether Louisiana's distribution of the EPA Fact Sheet sufficed to
constitute compliance with section 1464(c).96 The Fifth Circuit
then focused on the constitutionality of section 1464(d), which re-
quires states to establish programs "to assist local educational agen-
cies, schools, and day care centers in remedying potential lead
contamination in their drinking water systems." 97 Holding that
Louisiana complied with section 1464(c) and that the requirements
section 1464(d) imposed were an unconstitutional infringement
upon Louisiana's Tenth Amendment sovereignty, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision to award attorneys' fees to
ACORN and dismissed ACORN's claims. 98
94. See generally ThomasJ. Dillard, Note, United States v. Lopez: The Commerce
Clause v. State Sovereignty, Once Again, 22 J. CoNTEMP. L. 158 (1996) (discussing
likely implications of Lopez on future Commerce Clause conflicts); see also Hagen,
supra note 49 (commenting on impact of Lopez on congressional Commerce
Clause power); Stephen M. Mcjohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New
Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing Lopez in light of both
Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause). For a post-Lopez illustration of the
Court's recognition of states' right to legislate matters of sovereign interest, see
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act of 1988 on grounds that it violated states' Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity and represented over-extension of congressional Commerce
Clause power).
95. See ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1390-92 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2532 (1997). The Fifth Circuit commented, "[o]n appeal, Defendants
raise numerous alleged errors attacking the district court's award of attorney's
fees." Id. at 1390.
96. See id. at 1390-92. The Fifth Circuit noted that:
[Although] [t]here has never been any contention by ACORN that the
Defendants failed to properly disseminate the EPA's guidance document
and testing protocol . . . the [EPA] Administrator, having generated [a
guidance document and testing protocol], has never published more
than a notice of their availability in the Federal Register. Thus, the "pub-
lished" documents distributed by the State in compliance with this re-
quirement were not documents "published in the Federal Register."
Id. at 1391 n.10 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 1392-94. For a discussion of cases involving the adjudication of dis-
putes over the respective limits on the Commerce Clause powers of the state and
federal governments, see supra notes 57-94 and accompanying text.
98. See id. at 1392-95. Before concluding that Louisiana complied with the
LCCA section 1464(c) distribution requirement, the ACORN court observed that
Louisiana's "error, if any ... was inconsequential, in that the entities receiving the
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The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of
LCCA.99 The Fifth Circuit noted that under LCCA states share with
the EPA Administrator the responsibility of remedying the problem
of lead contamination in their drinking water.'00 The Fifth Circuit
also described that Congress enacted LCCA as an amendment to
SDWA, specifically intending to diminish the prevalence of lead in
electric drinking water coolers used in schools.101 The Fifth Circuit
then outlined each of the provisions of LCCA that were relevant to
the ACORN dispute and summarized ACORAs procedural his-
tory.102 The court next focused on Louisiana's argument that be-
cause both sections 14 64 (c) and 1464(d) unconstitutionally
infringed upon Louisiana's Tenth Amendment sovereign rights,
the district court improperly awarded ACORN its attorneys' fees.'03
The Fifth Circuit prefaced its discussion of the constitutionality
of the relevant LCCA provisions by noting its obligation to avoid
undertaking unnecessary constitutional analyses.' 0 4 The Fifth Cir-
cuit then addressed ACORN's argument that Louisiana failed to
comply with LCCA's publication requirements, determined that
Louisiana's distribution of the EPA Fact Sheet constituted compli-
ance with section 1464(c)'s obligations and concluded that ACORN
was therefore not entitled to recovery of attorneys' fees for that por-
tion of its claim. 10 5 The Fifth Circuit then found that although it
[EPA] Fact Sheet were encouraged to be more, rather than less, cautious in deter-
mining which drinking water coolers in their possession posed a health risk." Id.
The Fifth Circuit then went on to support its conclusion that LCCA section
1464(d) was unconstitutional by stating, "[b]ecause [section 1464(d)] deprives
States of the option to decline regulating non-lead free drinking water coolers
[we] ... conclude that [section 1464(d)] is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the
States' sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees fit." Id. at 1394. The Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that ACORN failed to establish that Louisiana had violated any
lawful requirement of LCCA at the time it instituted its suit, and therefore reversed
the district court's decision and dismissed ACORN's claims. See id. at 1395.
99. See id. at 1388-89. The ACORN court noted that states' obligations under
LCCA stem only from sections 1464(c) and 1464(d). See id. at 1388. For a discus-
sion of LCCA, see supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
100. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1388. For the pertinent text of LCCA section
1463 (a), which defines the EPA Administrator's duties of identifying non-lead free
electric drinking water coolers and publishing those findings, see supra note 36.
101. See id. at 1388. For a discussion of the historical prevalence of lead con-
tamination in the United States, as well as congressional attempts to address the
problem, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
102. See id. at 1389-92. For the text of the relevant provisions of LCCA, see
supra notes 36 & 37. For the procedural history of ACORN, see supra notes 21-30
and accompanying text.
103. See id. at 1390-95.
104. See id. at 1390-91.
105. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1390-92. For a summary of the Fifth Circuit's
discussion of the publication requirements of section 1464(c), see supra note 27.
1998]
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was able to avoid undertaking a constitutional analysis of section
1464(c), section 1464(d) warranted constitutional scrutiny.10 6
The Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning the Court set forth in
New York v. United States in assessing the constitutionality of section
1464(d). 107 Outlining the New York Court's establishment of guide-
lines for states' Tenth Amendment challenges of congressional ac-
tions, the Fifth Circuit noted its dual obligation to evaluate
Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause and to
consider whether the measures Congress employed violated states'
Tenth Amendment rights.108 The Fifth Circuit highlighted the un-
derpinning of the New York decision, stating "[w] hatever the outer
limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program." 109  Observing that states' options
under section 1464(d) consisted of either establishing the federally
mandated programs or being subjected to civil enforcement pro-
ceedings under section 1449(a) of SDWA, °10 the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that section 1464(d) was a "[c]ongressional conscription of
106. See id. at 1392. The Fifth Circuit commented that "[h]eeding the
Supreme Court's admonition to avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional
questions, we have foregone determining whether [section 1464(c)] breaches the
Tenth Amendment. Section [1464(d)], however, does not escape such inquiry."
Id.
107. See id. at 1392-94. In establishing the applicability of the Supreme
Court's analysis in New York, the Fifth Circuit referenced the brief the United
States submitted in intervention in ACORN. See id. at 1392. The United States
observed:
As recognized by the Supreme Court, the Tenth Amendment does not
bar federal requirements that states provide limited assistance in imple-
menting federal law. The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United
States did not change this well-established principle. New York is best read
as holding that the federal government may not coerce states into legislat-
ing according to the dictates of the federal government. It leaves in place
the well-established principle that the federal government can call upon
states to assist in the implementation of a federal law.
Brief for the United States in Intervention at 15-16, ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d
1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-30714) (citation omitted).
108. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1393. The Fifth Circuit noted its dual obligation
upon challenge of a congressional act to both consider whether Article I of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to enact that particular act as well as to discern
whether Congress's chosen regulatory method accords with states' rights under the
Tenth Amendment. See id. at 1393 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157-61 (1992)).
109. Id. at 1394 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
110. Section 300j of SDWA provides in pertinent part that "any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf- (1) against any person (including
(A) the United States, and (B) any other governmental instrumentality or agency
... ) who is alleged to be in violation of any requirement prescribed by or under
this title . . . ." SDWA § 1449(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300j (1994).
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state legislative functions . ..clearly prohibited under New York's
interpretation of the limits imposed upon Congress by the Tenth
Amendment."'i
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In ACORN, the Fifth Circuit invalidated as unconstitutional sec-
tion 1464(d) of LCCA, which mandated that states establish pro-
grams "to assist local educational agencies, schools, and day care
centers in remedying potential lead contamination in their drink-
ing water systems. ' 112 Finding the provision to be both an over-
extension of congressional Commerce Clause power as well as an
infringement upon Louisiana's Tenth Amendment sovereign
rights, the Fifth Circuit applied the Court's New York analysis." 13
Although both the statutory analysis as well as the constitutional
analysis the Fifth Circuit made were legally sound, its ACORN deci-
sion represents a poor policy choice, and one which is likely to ad-
versely affect the existence of the states as a unified and commonly-
focused federal body in the environmental policy arena. 114
A. Statutory Analysis
Before reaching a constitutional analysis of section 1464(d),
the Fifth Circuit correctly decided that Louisiana's dissemination of
the EPA Fact Sheet constituted compliance with section 1464(c)
and that ACORN was therefore barred from recovering attorneys'
fees under section 1449(d). 115 The Fifth Circuit thoroughly sup-
ported its dismissal of ACORN's argument that the term "publish"
as used in section 1464(d) requires publication in the Federal Reg-
ister." 6 In keeping with Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Romer, in
which the district court established as pre-requisites to recovery of
attorneys' fees under section 1449(d) both the claiming party's sta-
tus as a prevailing party as well as a showing that its action was the
111. ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394. The Fifth Circuit, in reaching this conclusion,
also observed that under LCCA, states "face a choice between succumbing to Con-
gressional direction and regulating according to Congressional instruction, or be-
ing forced to do so through civil action in the federal courts." Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1392-94. For a discussion of New York, see supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
114. For discussion of the impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision in ACORN, see
infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
115. For a narrative analysis of the Fifth Circuit's ACORN decision, see supra
notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
116. See id. at 1391-92. For a discussion of the ACORN court's treatment of
the conflict surrounding the meaning of the term "publish," see supra note 27.
19981 ACORN 503
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catalyst for the opposing party's acquiescence to its claim, the Fifth
Circuit correctly concluded that ACORN's failure to satisfy these
requirements eliminated its potential for recovery of attorneys'
fees. 117
B. Constitutional and Policy Analyses
1. ACORN: A Sound Constitutional Decision
In assessing the constitutionality of section 1464(d), the Fifth
Circuit correctly relied upon and applied the Court's New York anal-
ysis.1 18 New York is one of the Court's most recent decisions in a
long line of cases involving the dispute between the respective lim-
its of congressional Commerce Clause power and state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment. 19 The continued confusion and de-
bate over these limits has resulted in what can at best be described
as an ambiguous set ofjudicial standards. 120 By defining the states
as autonomous entities, the New York Court brought some resolu-
tion to this debate and provided the Fifth Circuit with a firm basis
for its conclusion that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause
power in promulgating section 1464(d). 121
117. See id. at 1395. For a discussion of Colorado Environmental Coalition v.
Romer, see supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
118. See id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of the New York
analysis to ACORN, see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
119. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). For a discussion of
cases leading up to the Court's New York decision, see supra notes 61-86 and accom-
panying text.
120. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law,
79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993) (discussing debates which have historically surrounded
federalism, as well as Justice O'Connor's consistent emphasis on appropriateness
of undertaking federalism approach when resolving constitutionally based con-
flicts). One author comments, "Congress' attempt to employ state administrative
tools to dispose of the country's radioactive waste is a symptom of the tensions
between the federal government and the states." Lyle Deborah Griffin, Comment,
A Glimmer of Hope for State Sovereignty: The Supreme Court Limits Federal Regulation of
Radioactive Waste Disposal, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 655, 657 (1993). This author adds that
as of its New York decision, the Court had not yet firmly defined its role in preserv-
ing federalism. See id. at 686.
121. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Com-
mandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law? 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1015
(1995). One commentator compares the New York Court's depiction of state au-
tonomy to that of preceding decisions, commenting that "New York's autonomy
model, with its strict differentiation of permissible inducement and impermissible
coercion, paints a very different picture [than cases which preceded it] of the role
of states within the realm of federal legislative authority...." Id. at 1015. For one
commentator's argument that Justice O'Connor has continually evinced an incli-
nation toward federalism in the line of cases in which she has been involved, see
Powell, supra note 120, at 638-39. See also Powell, supra note 120, at 689 (comment-
ing "[i]f some form of federalism ultimately does come to have a 'basis in firm
constitutional law,' New York v. United States is likely to be seen as its judicial gene-
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When the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Louisiana's Tenth
Amendment sovereign rights, it abided by the principles the New
York Court established. 122 The Fifth Circuit held consistently with
the New York Court's recognition of the merits of federalism and
conformed with the framers' intent that the Constitution govern a
unified, yet sovereign, group of states.1 23 Continuing the trend of
increased recognition of states' rights, the Fifth Circuit accurately
assessed section 1464(d) as an unconstitutional extension of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power. 124 Although the Fifth Circuit un-
dertook an appropriate constitutional analysis in ACORN, the
decision's unfavorable environmental policy implications under-
mine its soundness.125
2. ACORN: A Poor Policy Decision
Debate over the proper methods and avenues for environmen-
tal policy-making is largely attributable to the historical uncertainty
surrounding the delegation of legislative authority to the federal
and state governments by the Constitution. 26 This debate has fos-
sis") (citation omitted); but see Bereschak, supra note 60, at 564 (commenting
"[tihe line drawn by the [New York] Court, that Congress is prohibited from com-
mandeering a state into implementing federal legislation, is elusive at best" and
"[t]he Court did not set forth any affirmative tests to determine when Congress
crosses the fine line from coercive to commandeering"); Pohlenz, supra note 87, at
246 (noting "[t]he [New York] Court also strengthened states' rights, but at the
expense of public policy arguments supporting federal supervision over state
governments").
122. See ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394. The Fifth Circuit noted that "LCCA gives
the States no alternative but to enact the federal regulatory plan as prescribed in
[section 1464(d)], and such Congressional conscription of state legislative func-
tions is clearly prohibited under New York's interpretation of the limits imposed
upon Congress by the Tenth Amendment." Id.
123. See id. at 1392-95 (discussing both Tenth Amendment and New York, and
applying New York analysis to ACORN); see also Kahalley, supra note 70, at 134 (not-
ing "[t]he Constitution's framers intended that state sovereignty be protected by
something more than the political process, and the Court acknowledged this in
New York"). For evidence of the framers' intent as provided in the Federalist Papers,
see supra note 53. For a discussion of New York's impact on cases involving the
Tenth Amendment and federalism, see Pohlenz, supra note 87, at 236-38; John G.
Schmidt, Jr., The Tenth Amendment: A "New" Limitation on Congressional Commerce
Power, 45 RUTGERS L. Rxv. 417, 453-55 (1993).
124. For the Fifth Circuit's application of the New York Court's reasoning to
the ACORN conflict, see ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394-95.
125. For a critical discussion of ACORN as a poor environmental policy deci-
sion, see infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Percival, supra note 58 (commenting that national environ-
mental policy has virtually taken over contemporary federalism debates); see also
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 227 (1997) (dis-
cussing historical debate surrounding federal and state legislative authority). For
an overview of the historical uncertainty surrounding the Constitution's delegation
1998]
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tered the development of two theoretical approaches to evaluating
and determining environmental policy, namely, decentralization
and centralization. 127 In ACORN, the Fifth Circuit employed the
decentralist approach, which resulted in strengthening the New
York Court's endorsement of the states' attenuation from their exist-
ence as part of a unified, national body.128 Considering this deci-
sion's unfavorable environmental policy implications, however, the
Fifth Circuit might have arrived at a more desirable conclusion in
ACORN had it assumed a more centralist approach. 129 Apprecia-
tion of this proposal requires examination of the rationales of de-
centralization and centralization.
The decentralists view the states as the optimal crafters of indi-
vidual, interest-based environmental policies. 130 Decentralization's
focal theoretical points are the benefits of regulatory diversity and
competition among states, the importance of public choice claims
of powers to the federal and state governments, see supra notes 49-52 and accom-
panying text.
127. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv.
570, 599-613 (1996) (outlining historical development of decentralization and cen-
tralization). For a discussion of the development of decentralization and centrali-
zation against the backdrop of the continually evolving relationships between
federal and state governments, see Bagnall, supra note 62, at 563-65.
Observing increasing congressional regulatory activity in the environmental
arena, one author notes:
A groundswell of public and political reaction to pollution and unre-
strained growth led to the "environmental decade" of the 1970's.
Ushered in by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the decade
witnessed the creation of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as well as the enactment of nearly a dozen laws addressing
air and water pollution, noise, solid waste and land use.
Jeffrey T. Renz, The Effect of Federal Legislation on Historical State Powers of Pollution
Control: Has Congress Muddied State Waters? 43 MoNT. L. REv. 197, 202 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federal-
ism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1196 (1977) (discussing balance of power between state and federal govern-
ments). One critic attributes the federalization of environmental law to the exist-
ence of federal law as the most effective approach to overcoming localities'
overemphasis on their individual concerns and the utility of federal law in ensur-
ing minimum levels of protection to citizens regardless of their place of residence.
See Percival, supra note 58, at 1171.
128. See ACORN, 81 F.3d 1387.
129. For a proposal of a potential outcome of the Fifth Circuit's decision had
it assumed a centralist approach, see infra notes 13843 and accompanying text.
130. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 58, at 910 (commenting "the main reason
to decentralize is to achieve effective management"). The benefits of decentraliza-
tion have been defined as: 1) state and local governments are better able than the
federal government to reflect geographical variation in preferences regarding en-
vironmental quality and the cost of preserving that quality; 2) facilitating experi-
mentation with varied governmental policies; and 3) encouraging self-reliance and
self-determination among state and local governments. See Stewart, supra note 127,
at 1210-11.
[Vol. IX: p. 479
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ACORN
regarding equality of states' decision-making power and the weak-
ness of morality-based arguments for federal regulation.13 1 Alterna-
tively, in their support of the federal government as the best source
of environmental policy, centralists emphasize the desirability of na-
tional economies of scale.132 Centralization also highlights the abil-
ity of the federal legislature to overcome disparities in states'
effective political representation, correct market failures arising
from pollution externalities such as spill-overs and pursue moral
ideals on a national plane.' 33
The Fifth Circuit assumed a decentralist approach in deciding
ACORN. 34 By holding section 1464(d) invalid on the grounds that
it violated Louisiana's Tenth Amendment sovereign rights, the Fifth
Circuit negated an attempt by Congress to regulate states' establish-
ment of remedial action programs for the removal of lead from the
drinking water systems in schools, thereby granting Louisiana the
power to determine its own environmental policy regarding lead
131. See Esty, supra note 127, at 606-07. Two main benefits of regulatory diver-
sity and competition among states are: 1) it allows states to act as laboratories and
testing grounds in the formation of policies; and 2) regulations tailored to local
interests have proven to be economically more beneficial than those which sweep
broadly across all jurisdictions. See id.; see also Stewart, supra note 127 at 1210-11.
"Decisions about environmental quality have far-reaching implications for eco-
nomic activity, transportation patterns, land use, and other matters of profound
concern to local citizens. Federal dictation of environmental policies depreciates
the opportunity for and value of participation in local decisions on such matters."
Stewart, supra note 127, at 1220. Two arguments commonly advanced against cen-
tralization are that: 1) decisions made at the level of the federal government do
not accurately reflect the interests of states and localities; and 2) interest groups
are more likely to affect political decision making at the federal level than at the
state and local levels. See Esty, supra note 127 at 609-10.
132. See Stewart, supra note 127, at 1211. One commentator observes that
although noncentralized decision making has traditionally been favored in the
United States, in recent years Congress has defeated that inclination through its
enactment of environmental measures and standards. See id. He also asserts an
economic based need for national environmental policy by arguing that allowing
state and local governments to adopt lower environmental standards might poten-
tially lead to loss of industry and development. See id. at 1211-12; see also Esty, supra
note 127, at 600-05 (outlining historical development of centralization).
133. See Stewart, supra note 127, at 1213-17. One critic notes his absence of
surprise at both environmental groups' favoring federal environmental regulation
over that of state and local governments as well as the correlation between in-
creased public support for environmental protection and increased federal regula-
tion. See id. at 1213. He also comments that decentralization is ill-equipped to
address the conflicts and welfare losses jurisdictions suffer because of the effects
their individual decisions have on neighboring areas. See id. at 1215. Finally, he
notes a connection between the moral content of heightened environmental con-
cern and increased resort to centralized decision-making. See id. at 1217.
134. See ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
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contaminated drinking water. 135 ACORN therefore represents the
Fifth Circuit's fragmentation of environmental legislative authority
between the federal and state governments, an action which contra-
venes the framers' specific intent that the states coexist as part of a
union valuing the common interests and general welfare of its citi-
zens. 136 Had the Fifth Circuit assumed a centralist approach, it
might have held section 1464(d) constitutional and decided
ACORN in a manner more consistent with the framers' ideals and
current national environmental policy objectives.1 3 7
VI. IMPACT OF ACORN V E.DWARDs. BALANCING LEGAL AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Fifth Circuit's decision in ACORN will hinder the states'
collective pursuit of common environmental policy objectives. By
tipping the balance between state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment and congressional Commerce Clause power in favor of
Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit demonstrated its express indifference to
national environmental interests.1 3 8 Although the Fifth Circuit un-
dertook sound statutory and constitutional analyses in deciding
ACORN, its disregard of the paramount importance of environmen-
tal policy interests significantly diminishes the value of its deci-
sion.13 9 If those courts that oversee future litigation involving a
state's assertion of an over-reading of the legislative authority of the
federal government accord with the standards the Fifth Circuit in
135. See id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of a constitu-
tional analysis in ACORN, see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the framers' intent as expressed in the Constitution,
see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
137. One commentator observes that "[r]egulatory theory in the environmen-
tal domain must rest on an understanding of the unique nature of environmental
problems and environmental regulation." Esty, supra note 127, at 652 (emphasis
added). Other critics further emphasize the desirability of centralization by chal-
lenging the necessity of the states as independent legislative bodies. See Rubin &
Feeley, supra note 58, at 951. Also in support of centralization, one author argues
that adoption of a decentralist approach will lead to states' enactment of minimally
protective environmental policies, commonly known as the "race-to-the-bottom"
phenomenon. See Sarnoff, supra note 126, at 278-85; but see Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992) (arguing theoretical
unsoundness of "race-to-the-bottom" theory). For a comprehensive discussion of
the "race-to-the-bottom" theory, see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There A "Race" and Is It "To The Bottom", 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
138. See Sarnoff, supra note 126, at 232 (noting "[w]hen national evaluative
norms are employed, federal regulation is more likely than state or local regula-
tion to increase social welfare").
139. For a critical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's ACORN decision, see supra
notes 112-37 and accompanying text.
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ACORN set forth, it is likely that state legislative and policy-making
power will grow exponentially. This will drastically diminish Con-
gress's authority to regulate matters of interstate interest and cause
national environmental policy objectives to suffer.140
Rather than focus on the powers of either the federal or state
governments, courts should consider as an alternative the adoption
of a balancing, or middle-of-the-road, approach.1 4 1 This approach
would afford comprehensive consideration of the particular inter-
ests of the state and federal governments. Moreover, this approach
would both better serve national environmental policy objectives as
well as avoid the extreme results that employment of either a cen-
tralist or decentralist approach guarantees.1 42 By conforming with
courts' historical employment of constitutional analysis, the Fifth
Circuit failed to establish either a sound environmental decision or
any definite standard for resolution of conflicts involving the re-
spective powers of the federal and state governments under the
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment. Therefore, the judici-
ary should focus more on policy in its reconciliation of environmen-
tal issues.143 Because the environmental arena is becoming an
increasingly national concern, now is an optimal time for courts to
establish a sound policy-based approach to resolving disputes likely
to affect national environmental welfare.
Kimberly C. Galligan
140. For a discussion of the potential ramifications of allowing the growth of
states' environmental legislative authority, or decentralization, see supra note 130.
141. See Esty, supra note 127, at 653 (seeking "a middle road between the cen-
tralizers and the localizers in favor of a spectrum of regulatory entities"); see also
Bagnall, supra note 62, at 576 (noting "[a]lthough there are no immediate solu-
tions to the problem of federal mandates, a balance is needed").
142. See Percival, supra note 58, at 1178-79. The "focus should be on what
works best in promoting national interests in environmental protection in a man-
ner that is sensitive to state sovereignty." Id. at 1179. Before realizing this national
objective, however, "[o ]ver the next few years, we must face the challenge of sort-
ing the appropriate roles of federal, state, and local governments in protecting
human health and the environment... " Steinzor, supra note 34, at 225.
143. For a discussion of courts' efforts to define federal and states govern-
ments' respective Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment powers, see supra
notes 57-94 and accompanying text.
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